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Abstract The power grid is a directional complex net-
work of generators, substations, and consumers. We
propose a new load distribution law to emulate the
power grid. We assume that the power ow is trans-
ferred through all the paths connecting generators and
consumers according to their eciency. The initial gen-
eration of generators and the initial loads of substations
are calculated according to the path eciency and the
load of the consumers. If a node fails, it is removed
from the power grid, and all paths passing through it
will fail to transfer power. In that case, the loads of the
corresponding consumers are redistributed within the
whole network. During the failure cascading and prop-
agation procedure, our node removal rule is to remove
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the rst overload node along the opposite direction of
power ow, then the network distributes load and goes
on the cascade procedure. Our new removal rule for n-
odes does suppress the large scale cascading failures.
This work would be very helpful for designing the pro-
tective relay system and the tolerant parameters of the
grid.
Keywords Cascade failure  Load distribution law 
Node removal rule  Node capacity
1 Introduction
Our lives are lled with an increasing variety of net-
works, such as transportation networks, internet, power
grids, and communication networks. In those network-
s, cascading failure means that one or several nodes or
edges failure leads to failure of other nodes. Cascading
failure might ultimately lead to the failure of a consid-
erable number of nodes or the entire network.
Over the past decades, research on cascading failure
has become an important topic in the theory of complex
networks [1]. Several dierent models of cascading fail-
ure have been proposed. These models can be roughly
divided into two categories. In the rst category, only
the topology of the network is considered, and the dy-
namics and properties of the nodes are neglected [2{22].
In the second category, both the dynamics of the nodes
and the topology of the network are considered [23{25].
Cascading failure was investigated in a congested
complex network [2, 3]. In this model, the congestion
eect, dened as link performance function or cost func-
tion, maps link ow to travel time. The node failure re-
sults in longer traveling times, while the failure does not
aect the topology of the network. Wu et al. proposed
a model to study the cascading failure triggered by link
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congestion [4, 5]. Wu et al. also considered a capacity
and a load-generating rate in trac network [6]. The
models in [2{6] are often used for analyzing cascading
failures of transportation and communication networks.
Another model was proposed to measure the infor-
mation transfer and storage taking place in the network
during the cascading process [7, 8]. Wang et al [9] pro-
posed that the initial load of a edge was a function of the
degrees of the nodes. When the load on a edge exceeds
its capacity, it was not removed from the network, but
it could assign the extra load to its neighboring edges.
Kinney et al. [10] modelled the cascade process in the
power grid, dividing the nodes of the power grid into
three groups: the generators, the substations and the
distribution centres. The capacity and load of a node
are calculated without considering the dierences of the
node types. The assumption that node failure does not
aect the topology of the network in [2{10] is dierent
from that in the actual power grids.
Wang et al. [11] assumed that the load of a node
was its betweenness centrality (BC), which was dened
as the total number of shortest paths crossing the node.
The capacity of a node was dened, using two control
parameters, as a monotonically increasing function of
its initial load. Li et al. [12] assumed that the load of a
node or edge is the number of shortest paths through
the node or edge. Lai et al. [13] simplied the capacity
function in [11] by eliminating one control parameter.
However, the assumption in [11] that the energy trans-
fers only through the shortest path is not applicable
to many cases, such as power grid and transportation
network. The models in [14{16] proposed that the load
of a failed node was redistributed to its neighbouring
nodes. The models in [14{16] assume that the load of
a generator was only determined by its degree is of no
practical signicance to a power grid.
Wang et al. [17{19] proposed that the initial load of
a node was a function of the product of its degree and
the sum of its neighbouring nodes degrees. They as-
sumed that the load of a failure node was reassigned to
its neighbouring nodes. Wang et al. [20] studied the cas-
cading failures caused by the failure of edges using the
Ohms law and the Kirchho conservation law. Bao et
al. [21] introduced a model in which an admittance ma-
trix was dened and the DC power ow approximation
was used. Simonsen et al. [22] proposed that the load
of each edge was the sum of the ows that passed this
edge in both directions. Although the models [20{22]
are closer to the practical situation of a power grid, the
calculation is complicated.
Another category of model about cascading failures
considers the dynamics of nodes. Filatrella et al. [23]
demonstrated that the power grid could be modelled
by the interconnected Kuramoto-like model. Carareto
et al. [24] extended the work in [23] to understand what
would be the condition for a power grid modeled by the
Kuramoto-like network to present stable frequency syn-
chronization. The nodes in the models in [23, 24] were
divided into the generator and the consumer with iden-
tical dynamical equation. Sakaguchi and Matsuo [25]
proposed dierent dynamical equation for the genera-
tor and the consumer. This category model considered
both dynamics of the nodes and their synchronization.
It provides a more realistic physical description, but
demands a lot of computation cost to predict the redis-
tribution of loads.
In this work, a new model for studying cascading
failure in the power grid is proposed. The nodes in our
proposed model are divided into three categories: the
generator, the substation, and the consumer. The ini-
tial loads of consumers are predetermined, the initial
generation of generators and the initial loads of substa-
tions are calculated according to the eciencies of the
paths and the load of consumers. The distribution of
the initial loads satises the energy balance law in the
power grid, i.e., the sum of the generators loads minus
the sum of the energy lost on the paths (transmission
line) is equal to the sum of the consumers loads. In
our proposed model, the load is transferred directional-
ly through all the paths from generators to consumers.
The higher the eciency of a path, the greater the pow-
er ow transferred by the path. If a node fails, the node
is removed from the power grid, the consumers have to
get the power through other paths excluding the failed
node and then the loads of nodes on these paths will be-
come larger. If there are some nodes whose loads exceed
their capacities on these paths, we remove the rst over-
loaded node along the opposite direction of power ow.
We repeat the above mentioned process, until loads of
all the remaining nodes are lower than their capacities.
We do not consider the dynamic state of the node, so
we do not need to solve the dierential equations to
calculate the phase and frequency of the node, which
simplies the calculation process.
The cascading failure model in this paper has the
following features. Firstly, the power grid is modelled
as a directed complex network consisting of generators,
substations and consumers. Secondly, the power follows
from the generators to the consumers through all the
paths connecting them, the amount of power trans-
ferred depends on the eciency of the path. Thirdly,
the rst overload node is removed along the reverse di-
rection of the power ow, then the power ow is recalcu-
lated according to the new topology. All these features
of the proposed model are consistent with the practical
situation. For the best knowledge of authors, this model
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is being proposed for the rst time. Our simulation re-
sults show that, under the proposed load redistribution
law and the new node removal rule, the rate of cascad-
ing failure is much less than those predicted by some
existing models.
2 The proposed load distribution law
In our proposed model, the nodes of the power grid are
divided into three categories: generators, substations,
and consumers. The power that node i delivers to node
j (i 6= j) includes the power dissipated on the edge (i; j)
due to the resistance of the power line and the power
that node j receives. So, we dene the edge eciency
aij as the ratio between the power that node j receives
from node i and the total power that node i transmits
to node j. If the power ow is transferred from node i
to node j, the edge eciency aij has a value in (0; 1] ;
otherwise, aij = 0. We can then get the eciency ma-
trix A = faijg. We dene a path eciency matrix E;
the element of E, i.e., eij , is a value which stores the
eciency information of all the paths from generator i
to consumer j. In the power network, if there is an edge
between nodes i and j, we dene the weight of the edge
as the absolute value of the admittance between nodes
i and j, otherwise, it is 0. Then, the path eciency be-
tween two nodes connected by a path can be calculated
from the harmonic composition of weights of all edges
along this path. The harmonic composition of n edges
with admittances x1; x2; :::; xn on a path is given as(
nX
i=1
(1/xi)
) 1
(1)
Therefore, given a real power grid network as that in
[26], we can calculate the eciency matrix.
Here, we assume that there is no generator locat-
ed in the path from a generator to a consumer, and
the substation is only responsible for the distribution
of load and does not consume power. The capacity of
a node is the maximum load that the node can handle;
we assume that the capacity of a node is proportional
to its initial load determined by the tolerant parameter
Cc. We dene the eciency of a path as the product of
the eciencies of all edges in the path.
The proposed Load Distribution Law (LDL) is given
as follows:
Figure 1(a) shows the connection relationship be-
tween generators and consumer j, and Fig. 1(b) shows
the connection relationship between consumers and gen-
erator i. The arrow in Fig. 1 represents the direction of
power ow. We assign a initial load to each consumer.
According to the path eciency matrix E, we can get
(a)
(b)
Fig. 1 Illustration of (a) the paths connecting generators
represented by G to consumer j and (b) paths connecting
generator i to the consumers
the eciency of every path connecting consumer j with
generator i. Dene Pijk as the kth path connecting gen-
erator i and consumer j, eijk as the eciency of path
Pijk, LCj as the load of consumer j. Then we can calcu-
late the contribution to the load of consumer j coming
from generator i through the kth path given as
LGijk =
eijk
NGjP
m=1
MijP
n=1
emnk
LCj (2)
where Mij is the number of paths connecting generator
i to consumer j, NGj is the number of generators that
have path with consumer j as shown in Fig. 1(a).
Considering the eciency of the edge, the load of
generator i including the load supplied to consumer j
and the corresponding path loss is calculated as
LGij =
MijX
k=1
LGijk
eijk
(3)
The load of generator i is given as
LGi =
RiX
j=1
LGij (4)
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where Ri is the number of consumers that have path
with generator i as shown in Fig. 1(b).
We dene eijkl as the eciency from generator i to
substation l on the path Pijk, as shown in Fig. 1(a), and
it can be calculated by the product of the edge eciency
from generator i to substation l. If the substation l does
not exist on the path Pijk, eijkl = 0. Thus we can get
the load of substation l as
LTl =
NiX
i=1
RiX
j=1
MijX
k=1
LGijk
eijk
eijkl (5)
where Ni is the number of generators in the power grid.
We dene eijkt as the eciency of the path from
generator i to consumer t on the path Pijk as shown in
Fig. 1(a). It can be calculated by the product of the edge
eciency from generator i to consumer t. eijkt = 0, if
consumer t does not exist on the path Pijk. If consumer
t is located on the path Pijk, the load of consumer t is
calculated as
LFCt = LCt +
NiX
t=1
RiX
j=1;j 6=t
MijX
k=1
LGijk
eijk
eijkt (6)
where LCt is the power consumed by node t itself, and
the second term is the load owing from consumer t to
consumer j. The capacity of node i is dened as
Ci = CcLi (7)
where Cc  1 is the tolerant parameter, Li could be
LGi, LTi or LFCi, according to the type of node.
3 The proposed node removal rule in cascade
process
In this model, we consider the possible cascading fail-
ures caused by the dierent types of nodes. If a node in
the power grid fails, the node is removed from the grid,
causing matrix A and matrix E to change accordingly.
Thus the load of the remaining nodes are redistributed.
The load redistribution procedure is given by Eqs.(1)
to (5). According to the procedure, one node failure
can induce other nodes failure, leading to a cascading
process, until the loads of all remaining nodes in the
network are lower than their capacities.
In order to avoid large scale cascading failure hap-
pening, we propose a new node removal rule. If a node
in the grid fails, it is removed from the grid. The load
passing through this node will be delivered by other
paths to the ultimate consumers; it can lead the n-
odes on other paths to be overload. If along a path
connecting a generator to the ultimate consumer, there
are more than one overload nodes, we just remove the
rst overloaded node along the opposite direction of
 
Fig. 2 Topology of our scale-free network
power ow and keep the other overload nodes on the
paths, then recalculate the load until loads of all the
remaining nodes are below their capacities. Under this
node removal rule, cascading process will be terminated
rapidly and the scale of cascading failure is suppressed.
This node removal rule can be implemented by setting
the parameters of the protecting relay system of power
grid [27,28], therefore, it is of practical signicance.
In order to facilitate analysis, we dene the normal-
ized avalanche size [17] as
g = G=(N   1) (8)
where N is the total number of nodes in the power grid,
G is the total number of the failed nodes.
4 Simulation results
4.1 Demonstration of the proposed node removal rule
In order to demonstrate the proposed node removal rule
in detail, we analyse the cascading failure caused by
consumer 10 in a directional scale-free network consist-
ing of 50 nodes. The topology of the scale free network
is given in Fig. 2. We divide the nodes into the three
categories: generators, substations and consumers. We
assume that nodes 1, 3, 5, 11, 22 are generators, nodes
2, 6, 8, 23, 30 are substations and the remaining nodes
are consumers. Assume the Cc = 1, the failure caused
by failed consumer 10 is given as follows.
Figure 3 shows a part of the network topology re-
lated to consumer 10. We can see from Fig. 3 that con-
sumers 44, 46, and 49 get power from generators 3 and
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Fig. 3 Part of network topology related to consumer 10 of the scale-free network
5, through the paths passing consumer 10. If consumer
10 is removed from the network, the paths would fail
to transfer power from generators 3 and 5 to consumers
44, 46, and 49. Then the power consumed by the nodes
44, 46, and 49 has to be delivered from other paths
that connect the generators to these nodes. When we
check the paths that connect 44 with generators, we
nd a path from generator 5 to consumer 44 via node
17. When we check the paths that connect node 49 with
generators, we nd two paths: one is the path from gen-
erator 5 to consumer 49 via nodes 17 and 44; the other
is the path from generator 1 to consumer 49 via node
27. Similarly, we can nd four paths connecting gener-
ators 1, 5 and 11 to consumer 46. All these pathes are
shown by the lines with dierent colors and marks in
Fig.3. According to the eciency matrix and the load
distribution law given in Eqs. (2)-(6), we calculate the
load of each node on the total seven paths. We nd that
the nodes on these paths are all over load when Cc = 1.
According the commonly used node removal rule, all
these nodes including 17; 27, 1; 4, 16, 22, 28, 11, 41,
30 should be removed, then, according to the load dis-
tribution law, the power transmission is recalculated.
But in our proposed node removal rule, we only remove
nodes 4, 17, 27 in this step, which are the rst overload
nodes on the paths connecting generators to consumers
44, 46 and 49 towards the opposite direction of power
ow. Then the load redistribution law is used to redis-
tribute the load, and continue this procedure. In case of
node 10 failure, using our proposed node removal rule,
only 9 nodes is broken down nally. But if we use the
commonly used node removal rule, only 16 nodes can
still work nally.
From the above example, we have veried that our
proposed node removal rule can reduce the avalanche
size of the cascade failure, because the rst overload-
ed node is rstly cut rather than many others along
the path being cut. This node removal rule can be im-
plemented in power network by setting dierent relay
protection time to dierent priority nodes.
4.2 Cascade failure analysis of scale free network
In this subsection, the proposed load distribution law
and node removal rule are used to simulate the scale
free network given in Fig. 2.
We rst simulate the cascading failures triggered by
the failed generators. The avalanche size g versus the
tolerant parameter Cc triggered by the failures of gen-
erator 3 and 22 are shown in Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(b),
respectively. From Fig. 4, we see that, the g, as a func-
tion of Cc, exhibits a non-monotonic property. In Fig.
4(a), if Cc = 1, the rst overload node is node 4, which
has a degree value equal to 3. But for the same topology,
if Cc = 1:1, the rst overload node is node 6, which has
a degree equal to 8. It can be imagined that the nal
avalanche size for Cc = 1 and Cc = 1:1 might be quite
dierent even though Cc = 1:1 is bigger than Cc = 1, so,
the g for Cc = 1:1 is larger than that for Cc = 1. When
Cc is greater than 1.3 for Fig. 4(a), the generator failure
does not cause cascading failure. While, when generator
22 fails, there is no path connecting consumer 16 to get
power from any other generators and that makes the
avalanche size g will never be 0, no matter how large
the Cc is.
The cascading failures caused by substations are
shown in Fig. 5. Figures 5(a) and (b) are the plot of
g versus Cc triggered by the failures of substation 8
and 23, respectively. From Fig. 5, we see that, with the
increase of Cc, the avalanche size g decreases. In Fig.
5(a), when Cc is greater than 1.3, the substation failure
does not cause cascading failure, so the avalanche size is
0. When substation 23 fails, there is no path connecting
consumer 35 to get power from any generators. So, the
6 Hai-Peng Ren et al.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 4 Cascading failure triggered by generator 3 and 22
failure in the scale-free network is shown in subplot(a) and
(b), respectively
avalanche size g in Fig. 5(b) will never be 0, no matter
how large the Cc is.
Figure 6 shows the cascading failures triggered by
consumer 10 and 31, respectively. From Fig. 6(a), we
see that with the increase of Cc, the avalanche size g
decreases. While, in Fig. 6(b), the g, as a function of Cc,
exhibits a non-monotonic property. When Cc is greater
than 1.6 for Fig. 6(a) and 1.2 for Fig. 6(b), the consumer
failure does not cause cascading failure.
4.3 Cascade failure analysis of UK power grid
Next, we use the UK power grid [29] consisting of 120
nodes and 165 edges. The topology of UK power grid is
given in Fig. 7. By assuming that nodes 17, 21, 25, 37,
41, 60, 68, 71, 77, 83, 93, 111, 120 are generators, nodes
18, 23, 46, 55, 65, 70, 85, 92, 94, 100 are substations
(a)
(b)
Fig. 5 Cascading failure triggered by substation 8 and 23
failure in the scale-free network is shown in subplot(a) and
(b), respectively
and other nodes are consumers, we can get a directional
network.
The cascading failure in the UK power grid trig-
gered by failed generators is simulated. The plot of
avalanche size g versus Cc triggered by generators 21
and 25 are shown in Fig. 8(a) and Fig. 8(b), respective-
ly. From Fig. 8, we see that, with the increase of the
tolerance parameter Cc, the avalanche size g decreas-
es. Since there is no path for consumers 16 and 20 to
get power from any other generators after generator 21
failed, the avalanche size g cannot settle down to 0, no
matter how large the tolerance parameter Cc is. When
generator 25 failed, there is no path for consumers 24
and 27 to get power from any other generators. So, in
Fig. 8(b), the avalanche size g cannot settle down to 0,
no matter how large the tolerance parameter Cc is.
The cascading failures of UK power grid caused by
substations are shown in Fig. 9. Figures 9(a) and (b)
are the cascading failures triggered by the failures of
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 6 Cascading failure triggered by consumers 10 and 31
failure in the scale-free network is shown in subplot(a) and
(b), respectively
 
Fig. 7 UK power grid topology
(a)
(b)
Fig. 8 Cascading failure triggered by generators 21 and 25
failure in the UK power grid is shown in subplot(a) and (b),
respectively
substation 46 and 94, respectively. From Fig. 9(a), we
see that, with the increase of the tolerance parameter
Cc, the avalanche size g decreases. When substation 46
is removed, there is no path for consumer 45 to get
power from any generators. So, the avalanche size g in
Fig. 9(a) will not be 0, no matter how large the Cc is.
While, in Fig. 9(b), the g, as a function of Cc, exhibits a
non-monotonic property. Once Cc is larger than 1.5, the
substation 94 failure does not cause cascading failure.
The cascading failures caused by consumers are shown
in Fig. 10. Subplots (a) and (b) in Fig. 10 are the cas-
cading failures triggered by the failures of consumer 19
and 28, respectively. In Fig. 10(a), the avalanche size g
is always 0, since consumer 19 does not provide pow-
er to any other consumer nodes and its failure will not
aect any other nodes. While, in Fig. 10(b), with the
increase of the tolerance parameter Cc, the avalanche
size g decreases, and g is 0 when Cc is larger than 1.6.
Compared to the cascading failure caused by generators
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 9 Cascading failure triggered by substations 46 and 94
failure in the UK power grid is shown in subplot(a) and (b),
respectively
and substations, the consumer failure will cause less ef-
fect on the scale of the cascading failure of the grid,
because the load of the whole grid tends to decrease,
when a consumer is removed.
4.4 Comparison of the proposed cascade failure
analysis model and the model in [18]
For comparison purpose, we do the following. We com-
pare our proposed load distribution law and node re-
moval rule to the models in [18] with dierent param-
eters. To show the dierent cascade procedure using
dierent node removal rule, we compare our proposed
node removal rule to the commonly used removal rule,
i.e. to remove all the overload nodes in the grid. The
comparison results are shown in Figs. 11 and 12.
Figures 11 (a) and (b) show the cascading failures
caused by the failed generator 22 and consumer 31 in
(a)
(b)
Fig. 10 Cascading failure triggered by consumers 19 and 28
failure in the UK power grid is shown in subplot(a) and (b),
respectively
the scale-free network based on the two removal rules
and dierent model parameters of the model in [18].
Figure 12 (a) and (b) show the cascading failures trig-
gered by the failure generators 21 and 25 in the UK
power grid based on the two removal rules and dierent
model parameters of the model in [18]. From Figs. 11
and 12, we see that using the proposed node removal
rule, the avalanche size can be decreased, especially,
when the tolerant parameter Cc is small.
In addition, we simulate the cascading failures trig-
gered by every node under the dierent node removal
rule and get the distribution of the avalanche size as
shown in Figs. 13 and 14.
Figures 13(a) and 14(a) are the avalanche size dis-
tribution using our proposed method for analyzing the
50 nodes scale free network and UK power grid, respec-
tively. Figures 13(b) and 14(b) are the avalanche size
distribution using our load distribution law and com-
monly used node removal rule (that removes all over-
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 11 Cascading failures triggered by generator 22 and
consumer 31 failure in the scale-free network based on dier-
ent models are shown in subplot(a) and (b), respectively
load nodes) for analyzing the 50 nodes scale free net-
work and UK power grid, respectively. Figures 13(c)
and 14(c) are the avalanche size distribution using the
model in [18] with the parameter  = 0:5 for analyz-
ing the 50 nodes scale free network and UK power grid,
respectively. Figures 13(d) and 14(d) are the avalanche
size distribution using the model in [18] with the pa-
rameter  = 0:7 for analyzing the 50 nodes scale free
network and UK power grid, respectively. Figures 13(e)
and 14(e) are the avalanche size distribution using the
model in [18] with the parameter  = 0:9 for analyz-
ing the 50 nodes scale free network and UK power grid,
respectively.
In Figs. 13 and 14, the horizontal axis is the tol-
erant parameter Cc. The avalanche size distribution is
given using the dierent bar length corresponding to
the tolerant value. The black white right diagonal lled
bar corresponds to a situation where one node over-
loads, and fails, resulting in no cascade, i.e., g=0. The
(a)
(b)
Fig. 12 Cascading failures triggered by generators 21 and
25 failure in the UK power grid based on dierent models are
shown in subplot(a) and (b), respectively
blue horizontal line lled bar corresponds to a situa-
tion where the failure of one node followed the cas-
cade has produced a cascade with intensity given by
0 < g  0:3. The green left diagonal lled bar corre-
sponds to 0:3 < g  0:5. The orange point lled bar
corresponds to 0:5 < g  0:7. The brown cross lled
bar corresponds to 0:7 < g  1. The thickness of the
bar represents the likelihood to have cascades by one
node failure with that given g interval. For example,
in Fig. 13 (a), for Cc = 1 the length of black white
right diagonal lled bar being 0.38 means that 38 per-
cent of single node failure will not cause cascade failure;
likewise, the length of orange point lled bar being 0.1
means that 10 percent of single node failure will cause
0:5 < g  0:7.
We can see, from Figs. 13 and 14, that the proposed
node removal rule has a low possibility to cause large
avalanche size under the same small tolerant parameter,
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Fig. 13 The distribution of the avalanche size variation ver-
sus Cc in the scale-free network
Fig. 14 The distribution of the avalanche size variation ver-
sus Cc in the UK power grid
which helps to avoid large size cascade failure under the
small tolerant parameter.
5 Conclusion
A new power grid model for cascading failure analysis
is proposed in this work. In this model, the nodes of
the power grid are divided into generators, substations,
and consumers. A new load distribution law and a new
node removal rule are proposed, under which the scale
of cascading failure is reduced as compared to the model
in [18] and to the commonly used rule of removing all
the overload nodes. The proposed node removal rule
does help to decrease the dangers of large scale power
failure at small Cc. Our work may shed light on the
tolerance parameter selection and the protective relay
system design to suppress the possibility of the large
scale cascade failure.
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